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THE CASE AGAINST BULLET. APPROVAL 
AND PLURALtTY VOTING 
Donald G. Saari 
Jill Van Newenhizen 
I t  i s  we l l  Known that p l u r a l i t y  vo t ing  need not r e f l e c t  the t rue sentiments of 
the uoters. When there are more than two candidates running f o r  the same o f f i c e ,  i t  
i s  probable tha t  the candidate approved by most o f  the voters won't win. Examples 
abound; perhaps the best Known one i s  the Senatorial  e lect ion i n  the s ta te  o f  New 
YorK dur ing  1970. Conservative James Buckler benef i ted fram a s p l i t  uote f o r  h i s  two 
l i b e r a l  .opponents; he was e lected w i t h  3YL o f  the vote even though 61% o f  the 
e lec tora te  pre fer red a l i b e r a l .  I n  the 1983 Democratic Party primary campaign f o r  
the mayor o f  Chicago, the black candidate, Harold Washington, was e lected because o f  
a s p l i t  vote f o r  h i s  two whi te opponents, Jane Bryne and Richard Daley. Indeed, 
examples can be found i n  many c lose ly  contested e lec t ions  among three or more 
candidates. 
To i l l u s t r a t e  the problem, consider the fo l lowing example o f  f i f t e e n  voters and 
three candidates A, B, and C. Suppose the uoters'  preferences are s p l i t  i n  the 
fo l lowing way: Six o f  the voters have the ranking A)C)B; f i v e  haue the ranking 
B)C)A, and four  haue the ranking C)B)A. The r e s u l t  o f  a p l u r a l i t y  e lec t i on  i s  A)B)C 
w i t h  a t a l l y  6:5:4. But, although A i s  elected, a ma jo r i t y  (60%) of  these voters 
pre fer  B t o  A. More ser iously,  a ma jo r i t y  (60%) o f  these voters pre fer  C, the l a s t  
place candidate, t o  4,  and 213 of them pre fer  C t o  B! So, C i s  the pre fer red 
candidate, but t h i s  f a c t  isn' t  r e f l e c t e d  i n  the e lec t ion  resu l ts .  Th is  i s  because 
w i t h  a p l u r a l i t y  vote the voters can vote f o r  only t h e i r  top ranked candidate. 
Voters are aware of t h i s  phenanena and react  by using s t ra teg ic  vo t i ng  
behavior. Th is  i s  manifested by the c m o n  r e f r a i n  near e lec t ion  time o f  'Don't 
waste your uote, mark your b a l l o t  fo r  ---.' To remain viable, candidates must 
devote valuable campaign time t o  counter t h i s  ef fect .  For instance, dur ing the 1984 
pres ident ia l  pr imaries, Jesse Jackson urged h i s  fo l lowers t o  vote f o r  him ra ther  
than s t r a t e g i c a l l y  vo t ing  fo r  Walter Mondale. 
There i s  l i t t l e  question that  t h i s  instrument o f  democracy i s  i n  need o f  
reform. Bu t ,  what shou ld  be i t s  replacement? One r e f o r m  measure, which i s  i n tended  
t o  cap tu re  how s t r o n g l y  a  v o t e r  p r e f e r s  h i s  f a v o r i t e  candidate,  i s  b u l l e t  v o t i n q .  
Here a  v o t e r  has two vo tes ;  he can vo te  f o r  h i s  top ranked cand idate ,  h i s  top  two 
cand idates ,  o r  he can c a s t  b o t h  vo tes  f o r  h i s  top ranked candidate.  For ins tance,  
i n  the  above example, i f  a l l  o f  t he  v o t e r s  had s u f f i c i e n t  rega rd  f o r  cand idate  C, 
then she wou ld  be e lec ted .  B u l l e t  v o t i n g  was used i n  I l l i n o i s  f o r  c e r t a i n  
l e g i s l a t i v e  o f f  ices.  
A  second proposed r e f o r m  method i s  a ~ ~ r o v a l  v o t i n q .  T h i s  i s  where a  v o t e r  
vo tes  f o r  o f  the cand ida tes  he approves o f .  As such, when the re  are  N 
cand idates ,  the v o t e r  has N cho ices ;  he can vo te  approval  f o r  h i s  top i cand idates ,  
i=l,..,N. Aga in  f o r  the  above example, depending upon the degree wh ich  the  v o t e r s  
favo r  cand idate  C, she may, o r  mar n o t ,  emerge v i c t o r i o u s .  
Approval  v o t i n g  e n j o y s  the support  o f  seve ra l  e x p e r t s  i n  t h i s  f i e l d .  I t  was 
employed f o r  a  s t raw b a l l o t  d u r i n g  the Pennsylvania Democrat ic p a r t y  conference i n  
December, 1983, C11, and i t  was used t o  s e l e c t  f a c u l t y  members t o  the  Nor thwestern  
U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s i d e n t i a l  search c m i t t e e  i n  November, 1983. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  i t  ' . . i s  
now used i n  academic s o c i e t i e s  such as the  Econanet r ic  Soc ie t y ,  i n  the  s e l e c t i o n  o f  
members o f  the N a t i o n a l  Academy o f  Science d u r i n g  f i n a l  b a l l o t i n g ,  and by the  U n i t e d  
N a t i o n s  S e c u r i t y  Counci l  i n  the  e l e c t i o n  o f  a  Sec re ta ry  General.  B i l l s  t o  enact  
t h i s  r e f o r m  a re  now be fo re  the s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  o f  New York and Vermont .' t 21 .  
Much o f  t h i s  suppor t  i s  a  consequence o f  the a n a l y s i s  o f  i t s  p r o p e r t i e s  by two 
o f  i t s  foremost advocates, Steven Brams and Pe te r  F ishburn.  Most o f  t h e i r  
conc lus ions ,  which h igh1  i g h t  severa l  of the d e s i r a b l e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h i s  system, a r e  
summarized i n  t h e i r  book 'Approval Voting'C31. To demonstrate the s t r e n g t h  o f  
approval  v o t i n g ,  o f t e n  they  canpared i t  w i t h  those c m o n l y  used systems which 
d i s t i n g u i s h  between two s e t s  o f  cand idates  - the  top k  and the r e s t .  P l u r a l  i t y  
v o t i n g  i s  the  spec ia l  case where k= l ;  i t  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  between the  top ranked 
cand idate  and a l l  o t h e r s .  Because o f  the t e c h n i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  invo lved,  no t  a l l  
of the p r o p e r t i e s  o f  'approval u o t i n g '  were found,  and i n  131 i t  wasn't compared 
w i t h  a1 1 o t h e r  v o t i n g  systems. 
A t  a  conference i n  J u l y ,  1984, one o f  u s  (DGS) presented seve ra l  nega t i ve  
r e s u l t s  conce rn ing  the  behavior  o f  approval  v o t i n g  (see 14,531 as p a r t  o f  a  l e c t u r e  
d i s c r i b i n g  what can occur w i t h  v o t i n g  methods. L a t e r ,  S. Brams p r i v a t e l y  asked 
whether t he  techn iques developed t o  o b t a i n  these r e s u l t s  c o u l d  expose o t h e r  
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  approval  uo t i ng .  We s t a r t e d  t h i s  p r o j e c t  w i t h  the  e x p e c t a t i o n  t h a t  
approval  v o t i n g  i s ,  i n  sane sense, b e t t e r  than most systems. But ,  we found t h a t  i t  
has s e v e r a l  d i s t u r b i n g  fea tu res  which makes i t  worse than even the  p l u r a l i t y  v o t i n g  
system. Indeed,  these p r o p e r t i e s  appear t o  be s u f f i c i e n t l y  bad d i s a u a l i f ~  
a ~ p r o v a l  v o t i n a  as a  v i a b l e  re fo rm a l t e r n a t i v e .  
I n  t h i s  paper,  we r e p o r t  on sane o f  these nega t i ve  f e a t u r e s  which are  shared by 
v o t i n g  systems, such as approval  u o t i n g ,  b u l l e t  u o t i n g ,  c a r d i n a l  u o t i n g ,  e t c . ,  where 
the re  i s  more than one way t o  t a l l y  each v o t e r ' s  r a n k i n g  o f  the cand idates .  The 
f e a t u r e  emphasized here i s  t h a t  the e l e c t i o n  outcome can be 'random" i n  na tu re  
r a t h e r  than b e i n g  dec i s iue .  More p r e c i s e l y ,  i f  the re  are  N cand idates ,  then t h e r e  
a re  N! p o s s i b l e  ways t o  rank them w i t h o u t  t i e s .  The purpose o f  an e l e c t i o n  i s  t o  
determine wh ich  one o f  them i s  the  group's cho ice .  I f  a v o t i n g  system i s  d e c i s i v e ,  
a  g i v e n  s e t  o f  vo te rs '  p r o f i l e s  u n i q u e l y  de termines  one o f  these rank ings .  However, 
f o r  approva l  and b u l l e t  u o t i n g ,  t he re  a re  a  l a r g e  number o f  examples where N! 
outcanes occur f o r  the  same p r o f i l e !  That  i s ,  each v o t e r  vo tes  h o n e s t l y  acco rd ing  t o  
h i s  f i x e d  r a n k i n g  o f  the  candidates.  But ,  as the v o t e r s  vary  t h e i r  cho i ce  o f  how 
t h e i r  b a l l o t s  w i l l  be t a l l i e d ,  each o f  the  p o s s i b l e  N! rank ings  emerge! 
T h i s  phenomenon can be i l l u s t r a t e d  w i t h  the above example. L e t  w,y,z denote, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  the  number o f  v o t e r s  f rom the  th ree  types  o f  v o t e r s  who vo te  approval  
f o r  t h e i r  top  two cand idates  r a t h e r  than j u s t  t h e i r  top  ranked cand idate .  Then, 
O(w(6, O(y(5, O(z(4, and the t a l l y  f o r  A:B:C i s  6:5tz:4twty.  I t  f o l l o w s  immediate ly  
t h a t  9 e l e c t  i on  outcome i s  a t t a i n a b l e  f rom these uo te rs .  For ins tance the  r e s u l t  
B>A>C occu rs  when 212 ( a t  l e a s t  two f rom the l a s t  s e t  o f  v o t e r s  vo te  f o r  t h e i r  top  
two ranked cand idates)  and wty(1. Even t i e s  a re  p o s s i b l e .  A  deadlocked e l e c t i o n  o f  
&B=C r e s u l t s  f rom z=1 and w+y=2, w h i l e  the  r e s u l t  B=C>A r e s u l t s  f rom w+y-l=z>2. - 
T h i s  example and the general  r e s u l t  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  systems such as approval and 
b u l l e t  v o t i n g  possess f e a t u r e s  which are  more u n d e s i r a b l e  than even those o f  the  
p l u r a l i t y  v o t i n g  system! Jus t  t h i s  s t o c h a s t i c ,  random n a t u r e  o f  the  e l e c t i o n  
outcome r a i s e s  s e r i o u s  ques t i ons  whether approval  v o t i n g ,  and r e l a t e d  methods, t r u l y  
o f f e r  any reform. The proposed cure  seems t o  be much worse than the  disease. 
T h i s  r e s u l t  doesn't mean we are doomed t o  accept  and t o  l i v e  w i t h  the  f a i l i n g s  
of the p l u r a l  i t~ v o t i n g .  There are o the r  ways t o  t a l l y  a  b a l l o t  which would r e f l e c t  
a  v o t e r ' s  f i r s t ,  second, .., l a s t  ranked cand idates .  For ins tance,  a  Borda Count i s  
where when the re  are  N cand idates ,  N p o i n t s  a re  t a l l i e d  f o r  a  vo te r ' s  top ranked 
cand idate ,  (N-1) f o r  h i s  second ranked cand idate ,  ..., (N-k) f o r  h i s  kTH ranked 
cand idate ,  .., and 1  p o i n t  f o r  h i s  l a s t  ranked cand idate .  (The Borda r a n k i n g  f o r  
t he  above example i s  the  d e s i r e d  one of C>B>A w i t h  a t a l l y  o f  34:29:27.) So, ou t  o f  
a l l  p o s s i b l e  ways the re  a re  t o  t a l l y  b a l l o t s ,  the problem i s  t o  i s o l a t e  those ways 
which bes t  cap tu re  the  w ishes o f  the e l e c t o r a t e .  I t  t u r n s  ou t  t h a t  the unique 
s o l u t i o n  f o r  t h i s  problem i s  the  Borda Count.161 
2. The m a i n  r e s u l t s .  
Assume the re  are  N13 cand idates  denoted by (a~ , . . , aN l .  L e t  W = 
( W I ,  ..., WN) be a  v o t i n ~  v e c t o r  where i t s  components s a t i s f y  the  i n e q u a l i t i e s  
W J ~ W K  i f  and o n l y  i f  j < k ,  and WI>WN.  Furthermore, we r e q u i r e  a l l  o f  the 
w e i g h t s  t o  be r a t i o n a l  numbers. (The o n l y  purpose o f  t he  l a s t  requirement i s  t o  
s i m p l i f y  t he  p r o o f s .  C l e a r l y  i t  doesn't impose any p r a c t i c a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  because 
f o r  a l l  commonly used methods the we igh ts  are  f r a c t i o n s  and/or in tegers . )  Such a  
vec to r  d e f i n e s  the  t a l l y i n g  process f o r  an e l e c t  i o n  -- W J  p o i n t s  are  t a l l  i e d  f o r  a 
v o t e r ' s  j T H  ranked cand idate .  Then, the sum o f  the  p o i n t s  t a l l i e d  f o r  a cand idate  
de termines  he r  f i n a l  r a n k i n g .  For example, the v e c t o r  (1,0,..,0) corresponds t o  the  
p l u r a l  i t y  vo te .  BN=(N,N-1,. . . , I )  d e f i n e s  the usual  Borda Count procedure.  (More 
g e n e r a l l y ,  a Borda Vector  i s  whenever the d i f f e r e n c e s  W J W J + I  a r e  the same 
nonzero cons tan t  f o r  j=i,. . ,N-1. An e l e c t  i on  u s i n g  such a v o t i n g  v e c t o r  i s  a Borda 
Count.) L e t  EN be the  vec to r  N - l ( l , l , . . , l ) .  T h i s  i s n ' t  a  v o t i n g  vec to r  because 
a l l  o f  the  components are  equal,  so i t  can't  d i s t i n g u i s h  how cand ida tes  a re  ranked. 
A s imple  v o t i n a  system i s  where a s p e c i f i e d  v o t i n g  vec to r  i s  used t o  t a l l y  the 
vo te rs '  r a n k i n g s  o f  the  candidates.  A aenera l  v o t i n a  system i s  where the re  i s  a 
s p e c i f i e d  s e t  o f  a t  l e a s t  two v o t i n g  vec to rs ,  (WJ), where the d i f f e r e n c e  between 
any two o f  these v e c t o r s  i s n ' t  a  s c a l a r  m u l t i p l e  o f  EN. (Hence, no two a re  the 
same.) Then, each v o t e r  s e l e c t s  a v o t i n g  v e c t o r  t o  t a l l y  h i s  b a l l o t .  
Examples. For  the  b u l l e t  method, the s e t  o f  t h ree  v o t i n g  v e c t o r s  a re  
l , O , . . , O ,  l , l , O , . . , O ,  2 , 0 , . . , 0 .  For approval  v o t i n g ,  the s e t  o f  N v e c t o r s  
i s  l , O , . . ,  0 ,  , , O , ,  O , . . ,  l , , . ,  0 1 , 1 , . , 1  For c a r d i n a l  v o t i n g ,  
the v o t e r  i s  f r e e  t o  s e l e c t  the va lues  o f  the w e i g h t s  W J  sub jec t  t o  c e r t a i n  
c o n s t r a i n t s .  For  i ns tance ,  t o  s tanda r i ze  the cho ices ,  the we igh ts  m igh t  be r e q u i r e d  
t o  sum t o  u n i t y ,  o r  t o  be bounded above and below by s p e c i f i e d  cons tan ts .  
The extreme indec i s i veness  f o r  e l e c t i o n s  which was descr ibed above i s  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  i n  the  f o l l o w i n g  d e f i n i t i o n .  
D e f i n i t i o n  1. A genera l  v o t i n g  system f o r  N cand ida tes  i s  s a i d  t o  be s t o c h a s t i c  i f  
t h e r e  e x i s t  p r o f i l e s  o f  v o t e r s  where all p o s s i b l e  r a n k i n g s  o f  t he  cand ida tes  
( w i t h o u t  t i e s )  can r e s u l t  f r a n  the  same p r o f i l e  a s  the  v o t e r s  v a r y  t h e i r  cho ice  how 
t h e i r  b a l l o t s  a r e  t o  be t a l l  ied. 
I n  o t h e r  words, f o r  these examples o f  v o t e r s '  p r o f i l e s ,  the outcome i s  random 
and r e f l e c t s  the  v o t e r s '  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  t h e i r  cho ice  o f  t a l l y i n g  procedure r a t h e r  
than t h e i r  r a n k i n g s  o f  the  candidates.  Thus, the e l e c t i o n  outcome c o u l d  be 
a ~ > a z > .  . .>an, or an>an-I>.  . > a l ,  or  a1 > a ~ > .  . ., e t c .  where the  
de te rm in ing  f a c t o r  i s  the vo ters '  choice o f  how t h e i r  b a l l o t s  a re  t o  be t a l l i e d ,  not 
t h e i r  rank ings  o f  the candidates.  As i n  the i n t r o d u c t o r y  example, a l l  rank ings,  
even those w i t h  t i e s  can occur.  T h i s  random f e a t u r e  i s  a  p r o p e r t y  we want t o  avoid,  
so  i t  i s  impor tant  t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  those general v o t i n g  systems which have i t .  
Theorem 1. Assune t h e r e  are  N)3 candidates. A1 1 genera l  v o t i n g  systems are  
s tochas t  i c .  
As i l l u s t r a t e d  by  the i n t r o d u c t o r y  example, a  major  c r i t i c i s m  o f  the  p l u r a l  i t y  
vo te  i s  t h a t  i t  need n o t  r e f l e c t  the uoters '  t r u e  wishes.  To q u a n t i f y  t h i s ,  we need 
a  measure of the t r u e  sent iment o f  the vo te rs .  The one most commonly used i s  the 
Condorcet w inner .  
D e f i n i t i o n  2. Assume t h a t  the  N)3 cand idates  a r e  ( a ~ , a z , . . , a ~ ) .  Candidate 
a r  i s  c a l l e d  a  Condorcet winner i f ,  i n  a11 p o s s i b l e  p a i r w i s e  canpar is ions ,  a r  
a lways w i n s  by  a  m a j o r i t y  vo te .  A  Condorcet l o s e r  i s  an cand idate  which always 
l o s e s  by a  m a j o r i t y  v o t e  i n  a11 p o s s i b l e  p a i r w i s e  c a n p a r i s i o n s  w i t h  the  o ther  
candidates.  
A  Condorcet winner appears t o  capture  the t r u e  cho ice  o f  t he  vo te rs ;  a f  t e r  a1 1 ,  
she was the cho ice  o f  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  the e l e c t o r a t e  when she was compared w i t h  any 
o t h e r  cand idate .  But ,  the i n t r o d u c t o r y  example shows t h a t  the  p l u r a l i t y  vote can 
rank a  Condorcet winner i n  l a s t  p lace  and a  Condorcet l o s e r  i n  f i r s t  p lace!  
A c t u a l l y ,  as i t  i s  s h w n  i n  161, t h i s  type o f  behavior  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  a l l  
s imple  uo t  i n g  systems w i t h  the  so le  except ion  o f  the Borda Count. 
Theorem 2.t61. Suppose the re  are  N)3 candidates. Then, f o r  any s imple  v o t i n g  
system o the r  than a  Borda Count, t he re  e x i s t  examples o f  v o t e r s '  p re fences rrhere the  
Condorcet u i n n e r  i s  ranked  i n  l a s t  p lace  and the Condorcet 1  oser i s  ranked i n  f i rs t  
p lace .  The Borda Count i s  the unique method which never r a n k s  a Condorcet r r inner i n  
l a s t  p lace,  and never r a n k s  a  Condorcet l o s e r  i n  f i r s t  p lace.  
How does a  general  v o t i n g  system f a r e ?  I t  t u r n s  out  t h a t  i t  can be even worse. 
D e f i n i t i o n  3. A  general vo t i ng  system (W_J) i s  ' p l u ra l  i t y  1  ike' i f  there are 
non-negat i ue sca la rs  ( b ~ l  such tha t  when the d i f f e rences  be tween successive 
components o f  Z ~ J ~ J J  are computed, a1 1  but one are zero. 
The summation def ines a  vo t ing  vector,  and the cond i t ion  i s  that  t h i s  vector 
d is t ingu ishes  between on ly  two se ts  of candidates. T h i s  cond i t ion  i s  s a t i s f i e d  
a u t m a t i c a l l y  when the general vo t i ng  method includes a  vo t i ng  vector o f  t h i s  type, 
e.g., a  p l u r a l i t y  vo t i ng  vector.  Thus, both approval and b u l l e t  vo t i ng  are 
p l u r a l i t y  1  ike.  Also, the cond i t ion  i s  t r i v i a l l y  s a t i s f i e d  should the general 
method include N-1 vo t i ng  vectors  which, along w i t h  EN, form a  l i n e a r l y  
independent set .  Th is  i s  because the vectors span RN.  
Theorem 3. Suppose there are N)3 candidates. Choose a  rank ing f o r  each of  the 
N(N-1112 p a i r s  o f  candidates i n  any manner you wish. (Th is  may be done i n  a  randan 
fashion; the rank ings need not  be t r ans i t i ve . )  Assume that  a l l  subsets o f  more than 
two candidates are t o  be ranked w i t h  a  p l u r a l i t y  l i k e ,  general vo t i ng  method. Then, 
there e x i s t  examples of  voters '  p r o f i l e s  so t ha t  
1) f o r  each of the p a i r s  o f  candidates, a  m a j o r i t y  o f  the voters  have the 
i nd i ca ted  preference, and 
2) f o r  each subset of three or more candidates, the outcme i s  s tochast ic .  
(As i t  w i l l  becme c lear  i n  the proof,  the cons t ra i n t  that  the geceral vo t i ng  
method i s  ' p l u ra l  i t y  1 ike' i sn ' t  necessary; the conclusion holds f o r  almost a1 1 
general vo t i ng  systems. We impose t h i s  assumption because i t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
s i m p l i f i e s  the proof w i thou t  i ncu r r i ng  much of  a  s a c r i f i c e  t o  gene ra l i t y  -- the 
general methods which have been ser ious ly  considered or used, such as approval or 
b u l l e t  vo t ing ,  s a t i s f y  t h i s  condi t ion. )  
Th i s  theorem means tha t  there e x i s t  examples o f  voters '  p r o f i l e s  where f o r  each 
p a i r  ( a ~ , a ~ ) ,  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  the voters  p re fe r  the candidate w i t h  the smaller 
subscr ip t .  Thus, the rankings o f  the p a i r s  are h i g h l y  t r a n s i t i v e  and imp1 y a group 
rank ing o f  a l > a z > . . > a ~ .  I n  s p i t e  o f  t h i s ,  f o r  the same voters,  the approval  
vo t i ng  rankings o f  all subsets o f  three or more candidates are s tochast ic .  Thus the 
approval v o t i n g  outcome over a s e t  o f  more than two cand idates  c o u l d  depend more on 
the q u i r k s  and fo r tunes  o f  how the vo te rs  s e l e c t  t o  have t h e i r  b a l l o t s  t a l l i e d  than 
on how they rank the cand idates .  The i n t r o d u c t o r y  example i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  f o r  N=3. 
Our goal was t o  compare approval v o t i n g  w i t h  the Condorcet w inner .  T h i s  i s  a 
c o r o l l a r y  of the  theorem when the rank ings o f  the p a i r s  d e f i n e  a Condorcet w inner .  
For instance,  when k 4 ,  t h e r e  e x i s t  examples o f  v o t e r s  so  t h a t  whenever a ,  i s  
compared w i t h  any o the r  cand idate ,  she always w ins  w i t h  a m a j o r i t y  vo te .  Yet, when 
these same v o t e r s  use approval  v o t i n g  t o  rank the  cand idates ,  t he  outcome i s  
s t o c h a s t i c  whether the s e t  o f  candidates i s  ia l ,az ,aa,a+I ,  i a ~ , a z , a s I ,  
a , a , a ,  a , , a  o r  a , a , a .  I n  o ther  words, i t  i s  
probable t h a t  a Condorcet winner c o u l d  w in  an approval e l e c t i o n  o n l y  by acc iden t .  
Moreover, the approval v o t i n g  outcome over any o f  these subsets o f  cand idates  i s  
random, so i t  i s n ' t  c l e a r  who i s  the approval winner. T h i s  type o f  an example i s  
important  because i t  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h a t  a general v o t i n g  method can be random even 
when there i s  a Condorcet winner;  a general v o t i n g  method need n o t  r e f l e c t  the 
vo ters '  t r u e  views. The g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  the example i s  h i g h l i g h t e d  i n  the  
f 01 1 owing formal  statement.  Because we aren' t  c o n s i d e r i n g  p o s s i b l e  subsets of 
candidates,  the c o n d i t i o n  on the general v o t i n g  system i s  re laxed.  
Corol  l o r y  3.1. Assume t h e r e  are  N)3 cand idates  which a re  t o  be ranked w i t h  a 
general  v o t i n g  method. Assume t h a t  the general  v o t i n g  system has a t  l e a s t  one 
vec to r  which i s n ' t  a Borda v e c t o r .  There e x i s t  examples o f  vo te rs '  p r o f i l e s  so  t h a t  
even though the re  i s  a Condorcet winner,  the r a n k i n g  o f  the N cand idates  i s  
s tochas t i c .  
Again, the i n t r o d u c t o r y  example i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  r e s u l t  f o r  N=3. Furthermore,  
t h i s  r e s u l t  extends t o  a l l  subsets o f .  the N candidates.  Thus, a general  method, 
such as approval o r  b u l l e t  v o t i n g ,  need no t  r e f l e c t  the wishes o f  the v o t e r s  over 
any subset o f  the  candidates.  
These negat ive  statements about approval v o t i n g  can be r e c o n c i l e d  w i t h  some o f  
the p o s i t i v e  ones wh ich  appear i n  the l i t e r a t u r e .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i n  c e r t a i n  
s e t t i n g s ,  i t  has been proved t h a t  approval v o t i n g  can r e s u l t  i n  a  Condorcet w inner  
be ing  ranked i n  f i r s t  p lace  C31. I t  f o l l o w s  f rom the above statements t h a t  such 
f a v o r a b l e  conc lus ions  can occur,  b u t ,  they a re  j u s t  one o f  the  many p o s s i b l e  
s t o c h a s t i c  f l u x u a t i o n s  of the e l e c t i o n !  The c o r o l l a r y  and the  theorem asse r t  t h a t  
i f  the v o t e r s  behave by choosing t o  t a l l y  t h e i r  c h o i c e s  i n  c e r t a i n ,  s p e c i f i e d  wars, 
then these d e s i r a b l e  outcanes w i l l  r e s u l t .  But  i f  t hey  don' t ,  then any th ing  can 
occur.  I n  o t h e r  words, r e s u l t s  as undes i rab le  as one may f e a r  are probable.  
Another imp1 i c a t  i o n  of Theorem 3 concerns those procedures  used t o  cons ider  
v o t e r s '  p re fe rences  n o t  o n l y  over the t o t a l  s e t  o f  cand idates ,  b u t  a l s o  over 
subsets.  For  example, the f o l l o w i n g  i s  a  s tandard  approach: F i r s t  rank the N 
cand idates ,  and then drop the candidate who i s  i n  l a s t  p l a c e .  Rerank the rema in ing  
s e t  and c o n t i n u e  t h i s  e l i m i n a t i o n  procedure u n t i l  o n l y  the  r e q u i r e d  number o f  
cand idates  remain.  Now, suppose we employ a  general  method, such as approval  
v o t i n g ,  t o  rank  the  cand idates  a t  each s tep  of t h i s  e l i m i n a t i o n  procedure. Theorem 
3 shows t h a t  the s t o c h a s t i c  na tu re  o f  the conc lus ion  c o u l d  f o r c e  the f i n a l  r e s u l t  t o  
have no r e l a t i o n s h i p  whatsoever w i t h  how the v o t e r s  r e a l l y  rank the candidates.  
Theorem 3 can be extended. For ins tance,  cons ide r  a s i t u a t i o n  where the re  a r e  
4 cand idates ,  b u t  t he  e l e c t i o n  i s  o n l y  c l o s e l y  con tes ted  among th ree  o f  them. Then 
we m igh t  expect  t h a t  the  s t o c h a s t i c  e f f e c t  a f f e c t s  o n l y  these th ree  candidates,  n o t  
the  l a s t  one. T h i s  does happen; r e s u l t s  about ' p a r t i a l  s t o c h a s t i c '  e f f e c t s  can be 
obta ined.  
So f a r  we've compared general v o t i n g  methods o n l y  w i t h  the rank ings  o f  p a i r s  o f  
cand idates .  Another t e s t  i s  t o  c m p a r e  i t  w i t h  p l u r a l i t y  v o t i n g  and o ther  s i n g l e  
v o t i n g  methods. A f t e r  a l l ,  i n  the i n t r o d u c t o r y  example, the conc lus ions  o f  
p l u r a l i t y  v o t i n g  a ren ' t  i n d i c a t i v e  o f  the vo te rs '  p re fe rences  as measured by a  
Condorcet w inne r .  The f o l l o w i n g  statement compares the  r e s u l t s  o f  a  general  v o t i n g  
method w i t h  any s imple  v o t i n g  system. 
Theorem 4. Assume the re  a re  N)4 candidates.  L e t  ~JN be a v o t i n g  vec to r  d e f i n i n g  
a s imple v o t i n g  method, and assume t h a t  a general  v o t i n g  method i s  g iven where a t  
l e a s t  two of the  v e c t o r s  and En are  1 i n e a r l y  independent. Then there  e x i s t  
examples o f  uo te rs '  p r o f i l e s  so  t h a t  
a. There i s  a Condorcet winner.  
b. I f  I& i s n ' t  a Borda vec to r ,  then the s imple  v o t i n g  method has any 
p r e v i o u s l y  s e l e c t e d  r a n k i n g  o f  the candidates.  
c. The genera l  method i s  s tochas t i c .  
I f  the  general  v o t i n g  method i s  e i t h e r  approval  o r  b u l l e t  v o t i n g ,  then the 
conc lus ion  h o l d s  f o r  N23. So, w i t h  the  except ion  o f  the  Borda Count, Theorem 4 
i l l u s t r a t e s  t h a t  examples e x i s t  where any th ing  can occur w i t h  the s imple v o t i n g  
scheme w h i l e  the  general  method i s  s tochas t i c .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h i s  i m p l i e s  the 
ex is tence o f  examples o f  v o t e r s '  p r o f i l e s  where the p l u r a l i t y  outcome does rank the 
Condorcet winner i n  f i r s t  p lace  w h i l e  approval v o t i n g  has a s t o c h a s t i c  e f f e c t .  
Consequently, i t i s  p robab le  t h a t  the p l u r a l  i t y  e l e c t  i o n  r e s u l  ts  r e f l e c t  the 
vo te rs '  wishes w h i l e  approval  v o t i n g  does no t .  Again, t h i s  i s  because the random 
f l u x u a t i o n s  o f  approval  v o t i n g  a l  law any type o f  e l e c t i o n  r e s u l t  t o  emerge. A 
second consequence of t h i s  theorem, a long w i t h  Theorem 2, i s  t h a t  among a l l  s i n g l e  
v o t i n g  systems, o n l y  the  Borda Count r e f l e c t s  the vo te rs '  i n t e n t .  
A remain ing issue i s  the  robustness o f  these conc lus ions.  That i s ,  can we 
d i sm iss  these s ta tements  because the conc lus ions occur o n l y  w i t h  some h i g h l y  
p a t h o l o g i c a l  example which i s  h i g h l y  u n l i k e l y  t o  occur? We show t h i s  i sn ' t  so; w i t h  
any f a i r l y  general d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  uo ters '  p re ferences,  these r e s u l t s  have a 
p o s i t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  o c c u r r i n g .  Moreover, as i t  w i l l  become apparent i n  the 
p roo fs ,  these s t o c h a s t i c  outcomes are more 1 i k e l  y  t o  occur i n  those types o f  
s i t u a t i o n s  which have been used t o  d i s c r e d i t  the p l u r a l i t y  system. I t  t u r n s  out  
t h a t  these random e l e c t i o n  outcomes tend t o  occur when there  i s  a c l o s e l y  contes ted 
e l e c t i o n  among three o r  more candidates.  
To show t h a t  these examples are probable,  we need t o  in t roduce a measure f o r  
the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  the  vo te rs '  p r o f i l e s .  I f  there  a re  N candidates,  then there  are  
N! p o s s i b l e  r a n k i n g s  o f  them. For each p o s s i b l e  rank ing ,  A, l e t  na be the  
f r a c t i o n  o f  the v o t e r s  w i t h  t h i s  r a n k i n g .  The sum o f  these numbers equa ls  u n i t y ,  so 
the re  a re  N!-1 degrees of freedom; these numbers de f i ne  a  u n i t  cube, C(N), i n  the 
p o s i t i v e  o r t h a n t  o f  a  N!-1 d imensional  space. Voters '  p r o f i l e s  can be i d e n t i f i e d  
w i t h  the ( r a t i o n a l )  p o i n t s  i n  C(N). Because a l l  o f  the usual  con t i nuous  
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  i d e n t i f y  a  p o s i t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  occurrance w i t h  an open s e t  i n  
C(N), outcomes a re  probab le  i f  they  a re  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  open s e t s  i n  C(N). The 
f o l l o w i n g  theorem a s s e r t s  t h a t  t h i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  our a s s e r t i o n s .  A l s o ,  s ta tements  
a s s e r t i n g  the asympto t ic ,  p o s i t i v e  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  these examples, as  the  number o f  
v o t e r s  grows, f o l l o w  immediate ly .  The 1  imi  t s  a re  r e l a t e d  t o  the  measure o f  the open 
s e t s  i n  C(N). (See 14,51.) 
Theorem 5. For each o f  the above theorems, the s e t  o f  examples d e f i n i n g  the  
desc r i bed  behav ior  c o n t a i n s  an open s e t  i n  C(N). 
F i n a l l y ,  we are l e f t  w i t h  the  issue o f  re form.  The above demonstrates t h a t  a  
general  method does not c o n s t i t u t e  a  r e f o r m  a l t e r n a t i v e  f o r  p l u r a l  i t y  v o t i n g .  But ,  
t h i s  doesn't  mean we a re  f o r c e d  t o  l i v e  i n  the  imperfect  w o r l d  o f  p l u r a l i t y  v o t i n g .  
I n  Theorems 2 and 4  and i n  C o r o l l a r y  3.1, we see t h a t  the Borda Count i s  the  unique 
s imple  v o t i n g  scheme which avo ids  many o f  the  p i t f a l l s  assoc ia ted  w i t h  p l u r a l i t y  
v o t i n g .  T h i s  i n  i t s e l f  demonstrates t h a t  the Borda Count i s  b e s t  cand ida te ,  of the  
v o t i n g  methods, f o r  re form.  For a  more d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  o f  i t s  p r o p e r t i e s  a long  
w i t h  a  comparison of i t  w i t h  o t h e r  s imp le  v o t i n g  methods, see 161. 
3. Proofs  
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume the re  are  NL3 candidates {a , ,  . . , a ~ l  and t h a t  
the  general  v o t i n g  system c o n s i s t s  o f  the  v o t i n g  vec to rs  { W J ~ ,  j= l , . . , s ,  where 
512. Then, each WJ i s  a  vec to r  i n  the N  dimensional space RN. L e t  A  denote the  
r a n k i n g  a l > a z > .  ..>an, and l e t  P(A) be a  gener ic  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  f o r  t he  N!  
permuta t ions  of A. For v o t i n g  vec to r  WJ, any such permuta t ion  P(A) determines how 
the b a l l o t  w i l l  be t a l l i e d .  I n  f a c t ,  t h i s  t a l l y  can be viewed as be ing  a  
permuta t ion  o f  the vec to r  WJ. Denote t h i s  permuation by W J P ~ A ) .  For instance,  
i f  p ( 3 , 2 , 1 ) ,  then the s tandard  r a n k i n g  al>an)aa d e f i n e s  the  v e c t o r  (3,2,1). 
The r a n k i n g  a3)al)an d e f i n e s  the  permuta t ion  o f  W_, (2,1,3), t o  r e f l e c t  t h a t  
f o r  t h i s  rank ing,  two p o i n t s  are  t a l l i e d  f o r  a l ,  one f o r  an, and three f o r  a3. 
L e t  n p t a )  denote the  f r a c t i o n  o f  the v o t e r s  w i t h  the  r a n k i n g  o f  the  
cand idates  P(A). The t a l l y  o f  a  s imple  e l e c t i o n  u s i n g  W_J i s  
4.1 npca )WJP (a 1 
where the  summation i s  over a l l  N! permuta t ions  P(A). The outcome o f  the e l e c t i o n  
i s  determined by a l g e b r a i c a l l y  r a n k i n g  the components i n  t h i s  vec to r  sum. 
There i s  a  geometr ic  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  a l g e b r a i c  rank ing .  Consider the  
i n d i f f e r e n c e  hyperplane i n  RN g i ven  by XI=XK. I f  the vec to r  sum 4.1 i s  on the 
XK)X I  s i d e  o f  t h i s  hyperplane,  then a~  ranks h igher  than ax, and v i c e  versa.  
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  the N(N-1)/2 p o s s i b l e  ' i n d i f f e r e n c e  hyperplanes'  d i v i d e s  RN i n t o  
' r ank ing  regions' ,  and the f i n a l  r a n k i n g  o f  the cand idates  i s  determined by which 
r a n k i n g  r e g i o n  con ta ins  the vec to r  sum. 
For a  general  v o t i n g  system, l e t  m r r t a )  denote the f r a c t i o n  of those v o t e r s  
w i t h  a  P(A) r a n k i n g  t h a t  e l e c t  t o  have t h e i r  b a l l o t s  t a l l i e d  w i t h  the J T H  v o t i n g  
v e c t o r .  Then, the f r a c t i o n  o f  the t o t a l  number o f  v o t e r s  w i t h  t h i s  t a l l y  i s  
n p t a ) m ~ r ( a ) .  Consequently, the t o t a l  t a l l y  i s  g iven by the double sum 
4.2 Z n r  (a )[Srn~r (a )WJP ta 1 1 .  
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Again, the  r a n k i n g  o f  the  cand idates  i s  determined by the  r a n k i n g  r e g i o n  o f  RN 
which con ta ins  t h i s  vec to r  sum. 
We rep resen t  Eq. 4.2 as a  mapping. Toward t h i s  end, l e t  
Because each term de f ines  a  percentage,  the  s e t  Cnpta) I  i s  a  ( r a t i o n a l )  p o i n t  i n  
the  s e t  S i ( N ! ) .  For each P ( A ) ,  the s e t  Crnr r ta ) l  i s  i n  S i ( s ) .  ( T h i s  i s  because 
the  e n t r i e s  d e f i n e  non-negative f r a c t i o n s  which sum t o  u n i t y . )  T h i s  means t h a t  a  
domain p o i n t  i s  i n  the ( N ! - l ) ( s - l ) ~ !  d imensional  space 
T  = Si  (N! ) x (S i  (s))" !  . 
Any r a t i o n a l  p o i n t  i n  T  corresponds t o  an example o f  v o t e r s J  p r o f i l e s  a long  w i t h  
t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  s e l e c t i o n  o f  v o t i n g  v e c t o r s  t o  t a l l y  the b a l l o t s .  Thus, Eq. 4.2 
can be viewed as be ing  a  mapping fran T  t o  RN 
4.3 F:T -------- ) R", 
where F i s  the sumnation. 
Def ine the  "complete i n d i f f e r e n c e "  r a n k i n g  i n  RN t o  be the l i n e  g iven by a l l  
s c a l a r  m u l t i p l e s  o f  EN. The name comes fran the f a c t  t h a t  t h i s  l i n e  corresponds 
t o  where the re  i s  a  complete t i e  i n  the rank ings  of a l l  o f  the candidates.  N o t i c e  
t h a t  
a) the cunp le te  i n d i f f e r e n c e  ranKing i s  the i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  a l l  o f  the i n d i f f e r e n c e  
hyperplanes,  and 
b) t h i s  1  ine  i s  on the  boundary o f  a1 1  o t h e r  r a n k i n g  reg ions.  
To prove t h i s  theorem, we must show the ex is tence o f  a  n* i n  S i  (N! (a  cho ice  
of v o t e r s J  p r o f i l e s )  so  t h a t  as the  v a r i a b l e  m=CrnJpta)I v a r i e s ,  the image o f  
F((n*,m)) meets a l l  p o s s i b l e  r a n k i n g  reg ions .  
L e t  n* correspond t o  where there  i s  an equal number o f  v o t e r s  w i t h  each 
p o s s i b l e  r a n k i n g  o f  the candidates;  i .e., n*=(N! ) - i ( l  ,l,..,l). I t  f o l l o w s  
immediate ly t h a t  i f  m i p t a ) = l  f o r  a l l  cho ices  o f  P(A) ( a l l  v o t e r s  choose the f i r s t  
v o t i n g  v e c t o r ) ,  then Eq, 4.2 reduces t o  Eq. 4.1, and the image o f  F i s  on the 
complete i n d i f f e r e n c e  l i n e .  The same conc lus ion ho lds  i f  a l l  o f  the mrpta)  are 
equal .  T h i s  i s  because the double summation can be interchanged t o  o b t a i n  separate 
summations o f  the type g iven i n  Eq. 4.1, each o f  which y i e l d s  a p o i n t  on the 
complete i n d i f f e r e n c e  l i n e .  Denote t h i s  domain p o i n t  by (n*,m*). 
The idea i s  the f o l l o w i n g .  Assume t h a t  the Jacobian o f  F  a t  (n*,m*) has ranK 
equal t o  N, where, i n  the computat ion o f  the Jacobian, the n p t a )  v a r i a b l e s  are 
h e l d  f i x e d .  (We t r e a t  them as parameters.) T h i s  means t h a t  there  i s  an open s e t  
about the i n t e r i o r  p o i n t  m* which i s  mapped t o  an open se t  about the image 
F n , m  T h i s  open s e t  y i e l d s  outcomes which can be a t t a i n e d  w i t h  the same 
p r o f i l e  o f  v o t e r s  (n*) ,  bu t  where m, which i n d i c a t e s  the  cho ice  o f  v o t i n g  v e c t o r s  t o  
t a l l y  the  b a l l o t s ,  v a r i e s .  Because an open se t  about any p o i n t  on the  l i n e  o f  
complete i n d i f f e r e n c e  meets a l l  r a n k i n g  reg ions,  the conc lus ion  f o l l o w s .  ( I t  i s  
easy t o  show t h a t  there  are  r a t i o n a l  cho ices  o f  m w i t h  t h i s  p roper t y .  For d e t a i l s ,  
see 14,51.) 
Thus, the p roo f  i s  completed i f  we can determine c e r t a i n  p r o p e r t i e s  about the 
Jacobian o f  F  a t  (n*,m*). There are  two cases t o  cons ide r ,  and they are based upon 
the sum o f  the components of each v o t i n g  vec to r .  E i  t h e r  a t  l e a s t  two o f  these sums 
d i f f e r ,  or they are a l l  the same. 
Assume t h a t  a t  l e a s t  two of the sums d i f f e r .  For each P(A), e l i m i n a t e  the 
dependency of the components Crn r r ta ) l  by  s e t t i n g  m ~ r t a ) = l - ~ m r r t n ) .  Then, the 
jrt. 
rank  o f  the Jacobian o f  F  i s  determined by the maximum number of independent v e c t o r s  
i n  subsets from 
where P(A> ranges over a1 1 N! permutat ions o f  A  and where j=2 , .  . ,s. There i s  a  
cho ice  o f  j where the sum of the  components o f  WJ doesn't equal the sum o f  the 
components o f  M I ,  say j=2 .  Moreover, w i t h o u t  l o s s  o f  general  i t y ,  we can assume 
t h a t  the  sum o f  the components o f  bJ2 i s  l a rge r  than the sum o f  the cmponents  o f  
W I .  What we show i s  t h a t  the s e t  o f  vec to rs  
4.5 CW_z~(a ) -W_~r ta ) )  
spans RN.  T h i s  w i l l  complete the  p roo f .  
~t f o l i o w s  immediately t h a t  L ~ J r t h )  i s  a  nonzero s c a l a r  mu1 t i p l e  of EN 
w\- 
where the s c a l a r  i s  ( N - I ) !  t imes the sum o f  the components o f  ~JJ. Thus, 
~ ( W _ ~ ~ ~ ~ , - W _ I P ~ A , )  i s  a  p o s i t i v e  s c a l a r  m u l t i p l e  o f  EN, so t h i s  vec to r  i s  i n  
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the space spanned by the v e c t o r s  i n  Eq. 4 . 5 .  The simplex Si(N) has EN as a  normal 
vec to r ,  so the theorem i s  proved i f  the s implex i s  spanned by the v e c t o r s  i n  Eq. 
4 . 5 .  
Each vec to r  i n  Eq. 4 . 5  can be viewed as  be ing  a  permutat ion of the components 
of W-2-UI. L e t  vec to r  be the permutat  i o n  o f  g which has the l a r g e s t  va lue  i n  
the f i r s t  component, the second l a r g e s t  i n  the  second canponent, e t c .  (For example, 
if W_z=(5,4,2,1) and g1=(5,1 ,I ,0),  then e (0 ,3 ,1 ,1 )  and p (3 ,1 ,1 ,0 )  .) 'The s e t  o f  
a1 l p o s s i b l e  permutat ions  o f  9, 
4 .6  CVP t a l l ,  
agrees w i t h  the se t  i n  Eq. 4 . 5 .  Because " . . - -  ? m u l t i p l e  o f  EN, \-I can be 
viewed as b e i n g  a  v o t i n g  vec to r  and the v e c t o r s  i n  Eq. 4.6 can be viewed as b e i n g  
the v a r i o u s  ways t o  t a l l y  b a l l o t s .  That  t h i s  se t  spans Si(N) f o l l o w s  imned ia te l y  
from [7 ,43 .  
Suppose the sums o f  the components f o r  each o f  the v o t i n g  v e c t o r s  a re  the same. 
We show t h a t  the Jacobian o f  F  has rank N-1 and i t s  image spans a  s implex S i  (N). 
T h i s  r e q u i r e s  the f o l l o w i n g  adjustment i n  the  p r o o f .  F i r s t ,  an open se t  about m* i s  
mapped t o  an open se t  about F((n*,m*)) i n  the s implex.  However, such an open s e t  
must meet a l l  r a n k i n g  reg ions.  (The s implex has codimension one, and i t s  normal 
d i r e c t i o n  i s  g iven by the l i n e  of complete i n d i f f e r e n c e . ) .  Thus, a l l  we need t o  
show i s  t h a t  the vec to rs  i n  4 . 6  span the subspace or thogonal  t o  EN. T h i s  i s  the  
same argument g iven aboue. T h i s  completes the p roo f .  
The p r o o f s  of Theorems 3 and 4  depend h e a v i l y  upon the p r o o f s  and r e s u l t s  i n  
163.  E s s e n t i a l l y ,  the idea o f  the p r o o f s  i s  t o  use spec ia l  ways i n  which the  v o t e r s  
choose t h e i r  v o t i n g  vec to rs  t o  o b t a i n  a  s imple  v o t i n g  systems. Then, m o d i f i c a t i o n s  
of the type used i n  the  p roo f  o f  Theorem 1  and r e s u l t s  from l61 l e a d  t o  a  condi t i on  
o f  the type where F((n*,m*)) i s  on the 1 i ne  of complete i n d i f f e r e n c e .  The Jacobian 
c o n d i t i o n  f o l l o w s  f rom the a n a l y s i s  g iven i n  the p r o o f s  o f  161. 
Proof o f  Theorem 4. The f o l l o w i n g  i s  a consequence o f  Theorems 5 and 7 i n  [dl. 
Lema.  Suppose there  are  two s imple  u o t i n g  vec to rs ,  V_I and 92 which, 
a) f o r m  a l i n e a r l y  independent s e t  a long  w i t h  EM and 
b) a Borda uec to r  i s n ' t  i n  the  span o f  these three uectors.  
Rank t h e  p a i r s  of cand idates  i n  any way and rank the  N cand idates  i n  any two ways. 
Then, t h e r e  e x i s t  p r o f i l e s  o f  u o t e r s  f o r  which when the same u o t e r s  cons ider  each 
p a i r  o f  cand idates ,  a m a j o r i t y  p r r f e r  the des ignated one. When these same u o t e r s  
rank the  N cand idates  by the  s imple  v o t i n g  system V _ j ,  the outcome i s  t he  jTn  
r a n k i n g  o f  the  candidates, j=1,2. 
Acco rd ing  t o  the statement of the  theorem, the range space c o n t a i n i n g  the t a l l y  
o f  the  v a r i o u s  subsets o f  cand idates  i s  g i ven  by S=(RH)x(RH)x(R*)C where 
p=N(N-1)/2. The f i r s t  component space i s  the t a l l y  o f  the s imple  v o t i n g  system, the  
second i s  the t a l l y  o f  the general  v o t i n g  system, and the l a s t  p comp~nen ts  c o n t a i n  
the  t a l l y  o f  the  b i n a r y  comparisons. The domain i s  T. Thus, the obv ious summat ions 
d e f i n e  the  mapping 
F*: T -------- ) S. 
The p r o o f  f o l l o w s  much as i n  t h a t  o f  Theorem 1. We show the ex i s tence  o f  a s e t  
o f  p r o f i l e s  n' f o r  which the rank ings  o f  the  simple system and the r a n k i n g s  o f  the  
p a i r s  o f  cand idates  are as s p e c i f i e d .  Moreover, n' i s  such t h a t  t he re  i s  an 
i n t e r i o r  p o i n t ,  ma, i n  the product  o f  the s i m p l i c e s  which designate how the  v o t e r s  
s e l e c t  t h e i r  t a l l y i n g  vec to rs  so t h a t  F((n8,m')) i s  complete i n d i f f e r e n c e  f o r  the  
genera l  system. Then, the  above argument concerning the Jacobian o f  F*, i s  
repeated.  The main d i f f e r e n c e  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  eva luated a t  (nm,m') r a t h e r  than a t  
(n*,m*). 
F i r s t  we f i n d  m'. To do t h i s ,  we choose the m r p t a ) ' ~  t o  depend on j bu t  n o t  
on P(A). T h i s  d e f i n e s  a convex combinat ion o f  the v o t i n g  v e c t o r s  which a re  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  t a l l y  the rank ings.  I n  t u r n ,  t h i s  d e f i n e s  a new v o t i n g  vec to r ;  indeed, 
i t  d e f i n e s  a continuum o f  them where the dimension o f  the continuum depends upon the 
number o f  1 i n e a r l y  independent v e c t o r s  i n  the general  v o t i n g  system. Since we have 
a continuum o f  them a v a i l a b l e ,  and s ince a t  l e a s t  two vec to rs  i n  t h i s  system d e f i n e  
a th ree dimensional space w i t h  EN, we can choose the mJ's t o  o b t a i n  a v o t i n g  
vec to r  VN which,  a long w i t h  WN, s a t i s f i e s  the c o n d i t i o n  o f  the lemma. To use 
the l e m a ,  choose the r a n k i n g  corresponding t o  VN t o  be complete i n d i f f e r e n c e ,  t he  
r a n k i n g  corresponding t o  EN t o  be as s p e c i f i e d  i n  the  theorem, and the p a i r w i s e  
rank ings  as  s p e c i f i e d  i n  the  theorem. The conc lus ion  then f o l l o w s  from the  above 
and the lemma. 
Proof of Theorem 3. I n  t h i s  s e t t i n g ,  the domain and the image o f  F changes 
d r a s t i c a l l y  f rom t h a t  g iven above. Here we have 2N-(Ntl)  d i f f e r e n t  subsets w i t h  
a t  l e a s t  two candidates.  Thus, the range space i s  the c a r t e s i a n  product  over a l l  o f  
these s e t s  o f  Eucl idean spaces o f  the same dimension as the number o f  cand idates  i n  
the subset .  The danain a l s o  i s  increased s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  For each subset ,  t he re  i s  
a general  v o t i n g  method. Thus, f o r  each r a n k i n g  o f  the  cand idates  i n  each subset ,  
the  domain i s  increased by another product  o f  a s implex r e f l e c t i n g  the v a r i o u s  
cho ices  the  v o t e r s  have t o  t a l l y  t h e i r  b a l l o t s .  Le t  the  new domain, which i s  a much 
l a r g e r  product  space of s i m p l i c e s ,  be g iven by  T', and l e t  the  l a r g e r  image space be 
g i ven  by  R'. The t a l l y  o f  the  b a l l o t s  s t i l l  i s  g iven by summations o f  the  type 
found i n  Eq. 4.2. They d e f i n e  a mapping 
F':T' --------) R', 
As i n  the statement o f  t he  theorem, designate f o r  each p a i r  o f  cand idates  which 
one i s  t o  be p r e f e r r e d  by a m a j o r i t y  o f  the vo te rs .  We now appeal t o  Theorem 6 i n  
t61 .  A consequence o f  t h i s  r e s u l t  i s  t h a t  f o r  'mostm simple v o t i n g  systems, the re  
e x i s t  p r o f i l e s  o f  v o t e r s  so t h a t  f o r  each o f  the p a i r s  o f  the  candidates,  a m a j o r i t y  
o f  them f a v o r  the des ignated cand idate .  Yet ,  t h e i r  rank ings  o f  a l l  subsets w i t h  
th ree o r  more candidates i s  complete i n d i f f e r e n c e .  "Most' rep laces  the l i n e a r  
independence c o n d i t i o n  i n  the  lemma, and i t  means t h a t  the v o t i n g  v e c t o r s  f o r  
v a r i o u s  subsets  don't  make a  c e r t a i n  determinant  vanish.  For our purposes i t  
s u f f i c e s  t o  no te  t h a t  f o r  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  i s  s a t i s f i e d  f o r  any v o t i n g  v e c t o r  which i s  
' p l u r a l i t y  l i k e ' .  To use t h i s  theorem, we f i n d  a  spec ia l  case of t he  genera l  v o t i n g  
system which  i s  a  s imple  v o t i n g  system s a t i s f y i n g  the  above. 
For  each subset o f  more than t h r e e  candidates,  choose m ~ r t a ~ m ~ .  T h i s ,  
then,  d e f i n e s  a  convex combinat ion  o f  the v o t i n g  v e c t o r s  which a r e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  
t a l l y  t he  rank ings .  Now, choose the  m ~ ' s  so t h a t  CmJIAJ d e f i n e s  a  v e c t o r  o f  
t he  type i n  D e f i n i t i o n  3. Such a  vec to r  doesn't make the  determinant  c o n d i t i o n  
van ish .  I f  no t  a l l  of the  J'S are  p o s i t i v e ,  then they  can be p e r t u r b e d  so t h a t  
a l l  a r e  p o s i t i v e  and the  sum i s  s t i l l  a  v e c t o r  which s a t i s f i e s  the  non-van ish ing  of 
t he  determinant .  ( T h i s  i s  because the determinant  c o n d i t i o n  i s  an open c o n d i t i o n . )  
Thus, f o r  each subset, a  cho i ce  of the  Cm~3 can be made so t h a t  the  r e s u l t i n g  
v e c t o r s  over a l l  subsets do n o t  s a t i s f y  the van i sh ing  determinant  c o n d i t i o n .  
L e t  m' correspond t o  these cho i ces  o f  C m ~ p t a ) 3  over a l l  subsets .  Then we 
have from Theorem 6 i n  161 t h a t  t he re  e x i s t  p r o f i l e s  o f  vo te rs ,  n', so t h a t  the 
v a r i o u s  components o f  F((n',m')) a re  on the l i n e  o f  complete i n d i f f e r e n c e ,  y e t  the 
r a n k i n g  o f  the p a i r s  i s  as des ignated.  What remains t o  be shown i s  t h a t  the rank of 
t he  Jacobian o f  F', where n  i s  h e l d  f i x e d ,  i s  of the rank o f  the the  dimension of 
t he  range. But ,  w i t h  the m o d i f i c a t i o n s  o f  the  type g i ven  i n  the  p r o o f  o f  Theorem 3, 
t h i s  f o l l o w s  from the proof  o f  Theorem 6 i n  [&I. Indeed, the p r o o f  o f  Theorem 6 i s  
based upon t h i s  independence c o n d i t i o n  h o l d i n g .  
Proof of C o r o l l a r y  3.1. Theorem 4 i n  [&I a s s e r t s  t h a t  i f  the  v o t i n g  vec to r  
i s n ' t  a  Borda Vector ,  then f o r  any r a n k i n g s  o f  the p a i r s  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s  and f o r  any 
r a n k i n g  of the  N a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  t he re  i s  a  p r o f i l e  o f  v o t e r s  which w i l l  r e a l i z e  a l l  
o f  these outcomes s imu l taneous l y .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  the rank ings  o f  the  p a i r s  can be 
chosen t o  d e f i n e  a  Condorcet w inner ,  and the r a n k i n g  o f  the N cand ida tes  can be 
chosen t o  d e f i n e  the  complete i n d i f f e r e n c e  rank ing.  The hypothes is  o f  the c o r o l l a r y  
a s s e r t s  t h a t  t he re  i s  a t  l e a s t  one v o t i n g  vec tor  i n  the general methods which  i s n ' t  
a  Borda Vector .  Thus, m' can be chosen i n  a  manner s i m i l a r  t o  the above so t h a t  the 
r e s u l t i n g  v o t i n g  vec to r  i s n ' t  Borda. Then, the same type o f  p r o o f  goes through.  
Proof  o f  Theorem 5 f o r  hypo thes i s  o f  Theorem 1. The bas i c  ideas are  
demonstrated f o r  Theorem 1; s i n c e  the  ideas extend immediately f o r  t he  o t h e r  
theorems, we o n l y  prove t h i s  case. 
To prove the theorem, a1 1  t h a t  i s  necessary i s  t o  show t h a t  t he re  i s  an open 
s e t  U  about n* i n  Si(N) ( t h e  space o f  vo ters '  p r o f i l e s )  so t h a t  i f  n' i s  i n  U, then 
the re  i s  an i n t e r i o r  p o i n t  m' i n  (Si(s))N!such t h a t  F((n',m')) i s  on the l i n e  o f  
complete i n d i f f e r e n c e .  To do t h i s ,  we g i v e  a  geometr ic  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  Eq. 4.2.  
For each r a n k i n g  o f  the  candidates,  P(A), the bracketed term i n  the  double 
summation Eq. 4.2  d e f i n e s  the  convex h u l l  o f  the v e c t o r s  ( l d ~ t t a 1 ) .  Thus, t h i s  
means t h a t  the  double summation y i e l d s  the convex h u l l  o f  the N! convex h u l l s .  The 
f a c t  t h a t  the  image of F((n*,m)) con ta ins  an open s e t  means t h a t  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  
convex combinat ion o f  the convex h u l l s  c o n t a i n s  a  open s e t  around the p o i n t  
F((n*,m*)) on the  l i n e  o f  complete i n d i f f e r e n c e .  I t  now f o l l o w s  f rom c o n t i n u i t y  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  t h a t  the conc lus ion  holds.  
We conclude w i t h  an obse rva t i on  which i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  there  i s  a  l a r g e  
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  a  s t o c h a s t i c  e f f e c t  f o r  a  general  v o t i n g  system. Accord ing t o  the  
above p r o o f ,  a  measure of t h i s  i s  the abundance o f  the  p o i n t s  (n',m') such t h a t  
F((n',m')) i s  on the  l i n e  o f  complete i nd i f f e rence .  Bu t ,  accord ing t o  the  above 
independence argument, i t  f o l l o w s  f rom the imp1 i c i  t f u n c t i o n  theorem t h a t  the  
inverse image o f  t he  complete i n d i f f e r e n c e  l i n e  i n  T  i s  an a f f i n e  space o f  
codimension N-1. To o b t a i n  some f e e l i n g  f o r  the  s i z e  o f  t h i s  space, cons ider  the  
s e t t i n g  where N=4 and where we are us ing  an approval  v o t i n g  system (s=3). Then, the  
base p o i n t s  d e f i n e  a 58 dimensional l i n e a r  subspace i n  a 61 dimensional  space. 
I n c i d e n t l y ,  these la rge  dimensions a l ready  f o r  o n l y  4 cand idates  i n d i c a t e s  1 )  why 
s tandard  methods won't s u f f i c e  i n  the a n a l y s i s  o f  such v o t i n g  schemes, 2) why we 
used a c o n v e x i t y  argument t o  prove Theorem 5 i ns tead  o f  an i m p l i c i t  f u n c t i o n  
argument (which would have invo lved  a massive l i n e a r  independence argument), 3) why 
the s t o c h a s t i c  e f f e c t  occurs (F i s  t r y i n g  t o  f o r c e  the i npu t  f rom a 61 dimensional 
space i n t o  a 3 dimensional space, so we must expect such r e s u l t s ) ,  4) why s imple 
v o t i n g  systems don't  have as adverse e f f e c t s  ( t h e  subspace i s  20 dimensional  i n  a 23 
dimensional  space), and 5) t h a t  t he re  are  many examples o ther  than those suggested 
by the  p r o o f  o f  the theorems. (Because the 58 dimensional space i s  a f f i n e ,  i t  must 
i n t e r s e c t  the boundar ies o f  T. The boundar ies correspond t o  examples of vo te rs '  
p r o f i l e s  where there  are  no v o t e r s  which have c e r t a i n  rank ings  o f  the N candidates.)  
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